*The Mandate to Rule: An Introduction**

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ABSTRACT

This article presents two themes, the authority of kings and the mandate of the people. Monarchical authority is viewed at the confluence between consecration, contentions among the governing classes, and the impact of foreign powers. The popular mandate is examined in terms of the diminution of royal power, the demonstration effects of other countries, and the intellectual mobilization that leads to a reorganization of authority. The study will examine England, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan from the early formation of kingship to the Bolshevik conception of a popular mandate in the 1930s. The article explores the pedagogic, methodological, and theoretical orientation of this kind of comparative study.

In the distant past kings and aristocrats justified their authority by appeals to the will of deities. More recently, elected and appointed officials have justified their authority by appeals to the mandate of the people. Government has always been most stable where rulers and ruled believed that accepted standards are observed, that the government is legitimate.

This paper distills a forthcoming study of authority—the authority of kings, and of aristocratic governance in Japan, Russia, Germany, and England. It also treats the transformation of authority in England, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia, as the rule of kings was replaced by rule in the name of the people. A conclusion deals more briefly with the problems of state-building in the twentieth century.

THE MAIN THEME

Where wars and feuds are common, rulers can provide protection and thus benefit those who are ruled. If a deity or spirit is believed to sanctify rule, the rights of the few cannot be questioned lest sacrilege jeopardize the welfare of all. So, throughout history, the rule of the few has appeared to the many as if it were a force of nature: to be enjoyed when it was benign and endured when it was not.

There had always been some who questioned such attitudes. But a time came (historians call it the "early modern period") when many people began to question the good fortune of the few. In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau wrote that "the strongest are still never sufficiently strong to ensure them continual mastership, unless they find means of transforming force into right, and obedience into duty" (8–9). In France during the eighteenth century, men found it more and more difficult to distinguish authority from oppression, or right from might. Traditional religious appeals began to lose their force, while secular appeals on behalf of the

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status quo were of little avail. Rousseau argued that obedience was due only to authority exercised by virtue of right, and that acts of force were illegitimate. Throughout history, the weak had appealed to the deities or other supramundane powers to bear witness to their suffering. On occasion they had challenged the strong to live up to their own pronouncements. Now that authority had to be sanctioned from below, the weak could try to transform obedience into a claim which entitled them to some benefit.

The relation between the few who rule and the many who obey is not a contract which can be stated explicitly. It is rather a tacit exchange of conflicting claims and expectations in which both sides seek to strengthen their case by appeals to a transcendent sanction, whether sacred or secular. I believe this exchange between rulers and ruled is a universal feature of society.

For millenia it was taken for granted that rulers would rest their claims on divine sanction, and that such other grounds of rule as tradition or law also required and received their warrant from on high. But since the Reformation, the persuasiveness of this appeal has weakened. And since the French Revolution, the right to rule has come to depend increasingly on a mandate of the people. This change is one basis for distinguishing medieval from modern history, and hence, in the present study, for dealing separately with traditional and early modern societies.[1]

This division may be put in other terms as well. Before the early modern period, rulers assumed that the general population would be quiescent. In Europe, kings, aristocrats, and magnates of the church made claims against each other quite secluded from popular participation. Rulers even manipulated appeals to the transcendent powers without fear of seriously undermining their exclusive hold on authority. This seclusion of the political arena has disappeared. During the whole modern period all governance has become secularized. The few who ruled lost their exclusive hold on wealth, status, and authority. And ever since the French Revolution, political transactions have had public exposure, indeed increasingly so as the suffrage was extended. In modern society, unless measures are taken to prevent it, rulers and ruled alike must justify their claims in the public arena, and hence with an eye to the public reactions that are likely to follow. *Vox populi, vox dei.*

PRE-CONDITIONS

Studies of Japan, Russia, Germany, and England reveal three facts about royal authority. (1) Religious sanction of authority was universal in premodern societies. Since such sanction was based on the prevailing religious beliefs and institutions, it strengthened the hold of royal authority on the population. But consecration also entailed political liabilities in the relations between the king and the priesthood (or other sacerdotal functionaries). (2) The exercise of secular authority depended on the ruling house and the shifting balance of power among the members and most important retainers of that house. In theory, the territorial possessions of the ruling house (or of the Regent or Deputy who controlled the ruler) were the main source of

revenue, and of favors in peace and war. In practice, the territories of the ruler were scattered and the realm as a whole was governed through various forms of delegated authority. Polities were marked by recurrent contentions over the centralization or decentralization of authority in which rulers appealed to personal loyalty or consecrated obligations in order to buttress their position. (3) These contentions were affected quite directly by intrusions from abroad. That is, the internal balance of forces was affected by alliances with outside powers, a condition greatly aggravated in early times by the absence of stable, clearly defined frontiers.

All three factors—the religious sanction of royal authority, the internal contentions over the distribution of authority, and the intrusion of outside powers—helped to shape premodern governance. The point of paying attention to royal authority in the relatively distant past is to discover the early differentiation of political institutions. By then tracing each country's aristocratic culture forward into the early modern period, we can see that this early formation of political institutions had a bearing on the emergence of government by consent.

The Western idea of authority in the name of the people owes something to classical Greek and Roman conceptions of citizenship in the community. At one time the Greek city-state and the Roman Republic practiced a type of governance in which all male heads of households actively participated in political decision-making for the entire community. This fact has appealed strongly to the Western imagination. Despite its known association with oligarchic rule, slavery, and conquest and despite the many centuries during which it had lost political significance, the classic idea of citizenship helped to inspire the leaders of the French revolution.

The idea of a popular mandate also has roots in the role which consent played in Germanic tribal conditions. These traditions became known to Roman observers after 100 A.D. The tribes appeared to be governed by chieftains who ruled with the aid of a council of elders. Such chieftains succeeded each other on the basis of hereditary claims, provided that their accession to the throne was confirmed through an act of acclamation by the leading warriors of the tribe. During the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. these practices affected the Roman empire directly as successive emperors were elevated to the Imperial throne by the acclamation of frontier-armies largely composed of Germanic warriors. And as the settlement of Germanic tribes in the Western parts of the Roman empire became stabilized, the relation between the chieftain and his warriors was transformed into the contractual obligations between lord and vassal. Hence, the idea of contractually confirmed consent between rulers and ruled has very early antecedents.

The popular mandate also owes something to the Christian belief that all men are equal before God, an idea which makes rulers and ruled part of one community. As baptized members of the church, all have access to the sacraments and all are subject to Divine law. These egalitarian implications were evident in the early Christian communities, but they seemed to decline in importance during the long supremacy of the Catholic church. The Pope and through him the whole hierarchy of the priesthood stood in the direct line of apostolic succession; the church alone was the consecrated vessel of Divine grace. But with the coming of the

Reformation the beliefs of early Christianity revived, and emphasis shifted from the hierarchic conception of the church to one centering on the Bible as the repository of the Divine word. With this shift emerged the Protestant idea that through Scripture and an active faith every believer stands in a direct relation to his God. Eventually, some Protestant denominations came to define the Christian community again as a "brotherhood of all believers" in which responsibility for the spiritual welfare of all was shared by all baptized members of the congregation.

Some of these legacies are needed to explain what is distinctive about a popular mandate in England, France, and Germany; related or entirely different legacies have a bearing on the more autocratic variants of a public mandate in Russia and Japan. Authority in the name of the many came to the fore in the English and French Revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the beginning of the modern period. The idea of a popular mandate has had its greatest impact *since* that time. Participation in public affairs at the national level has widened: in one country after another the earlier dichotomy between rulers and ruled has become blurred. Class, status, and party rather than noble birth and inherited wealth have become determinants of the distribution of power. At the same time, nation-states with clearly defined and relatively stable frontiers have emerged.

THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

The change from royal authority to the mandate of the people must be seen in context. Before 1500 (this date is a convenient demarcation), authority and inequality were linked; men of wealth and noble birth were also in charge of exercising the functions of government. The vast bulk of the population was politically irrelevant; the people provided services and if they rebelled they were put in their place. After 1500, the rigid bond between authority and inequality loosened. Trade, the commercialization of land, labor and capital, the secularization of learning and the increase of a secular government service: all in their different ways allowed commoners to make inroads on the bastions of privilege. Those entitled to take an active interest in affairs of state slowly grew in number. People of noble birth and those who became personal favorites of the ruler had had a monopoly over political matters; only the church challenged that monopoly. But once the oligarchic monopoly was definitely broken, it became more difficult to justify similar monopolies on other grounds, such as wealth alone. If such qualitative changes could be dated, then early modern history began when people began to question these political monopolies.

The invention of printing, the age of discovery and of European expansion overseas, the growth of Humanism, the Reformation, and the early development of modern science—all these occurred in the decades around 1500. This was also a period of population growth, urbanization, and economic development. The secularization of learning speeded the *diffusion of ideas*, because the number of educated people increased, as did the number of those whose livelihood depended on teaching, writing, or some other intellectual vocation.

The sixteenth century was also an age of incipient nationalism. In one country after another, intellectual elites formulated ideas in self-conscious response to what they learned from abroad. The belief in the ideal of a popular mandate spread during and after the seventeenth century. And as some countries instituted authority in the name of the people, they provided models which were imitated, transformed, or rejected by the late-comers to the process of nation-building.

A VIEW OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

My study advances four interrelated theses. Social structures have very long histories of differentiation due in large part to the divergence of religious beliefs sanctioning authority and the internal and external struggles for power, as that authority was consolidated and expanded. By analyzing that differentiation one can show that "traditional" societies were neither unified nor integrated. Second, the breakthrough to popular sovereignty and industrialization in England and France occurred in social and political contexts that had been developing for centuries. By coming to that breakthrough later on, other countries gave special impetus to state-action and intellectual mobilization through which they hoped to catch up with a pioneering country. I want to show that the context and content of state-action and intellectual mobilization varies from one country to another. Third, many new states have been established in the twentieth century. They also look for analogues and precedents in other countries to help them with their problems. But today they have more models to choose from than was the case formerly. And often (though not always) they face the special difficulty that their own history ill prepares them for profiting from the example of countries which have had the experience of state-building for centuries.

Finally, there are methodological and substantive reasons for the comparativist to look at social structures from the standpoint of those who exercise authority. Their ideas and actions are the best documented part of the human record. Sympathy with the weak cannot change this fact. We require a plethora of data in order to compare societies over long spans of time. Also, when one studies the rulers of a society closely, one sees the disunity and the dilemmas they face as they advance their claims to legitimacy. Looked at that way, even the apex of the social structure appears much less monolithic or impregnable than it does otherwise. Such disunity and dilemmas bring out the constraints to which even the strong must submit.

THE PURPOSES OF COMPARISON

The main use of comparative analysis should be to sharpen our understanding of the contexts in which more detailed causal analysis can proceed. Attempts to assimilate such analysis to the methodological requirements of causal inference tend to founder because the number of cases is too small and the number of variables too

large. On the other hand, causal inference in the social sciences can gain from a knowledge of contexts. Otherwise, such inference may pretend to a level of generality to which it is not entitled.

By means of comparative analysis I want to preserve a sense of historical particularity as far as I can, while still comparing different countries. Rather than aim at broader generalizations and lose that sense, I ask the same or at least similar questions of divergent materials and so leave room for divergent answers. I want to make more transparent the divergence among structures of authority and among the ways in which societies have responded to the challenges implicit in the civilizational accomplishments of other countries.

TYPES OF EVIDENCE

This study draws for much of its evidence on social and political history broadly conceived. In this respect it differs from disciplines like economics, sociology, and psychology which frequently examine the manifest record of past and present behavior for what lies *behind* it. Such inquiry into underlying structures has been a dominant theme in recent intellectual history. Marxists and Freudians are at one in their attempt to discern the underlying cause of manifest discontents, even if they differ in what they purport to find. Some anthropologists and psychologists have turned their attention from behavioral studies to the analysis of myths in searching for the underlying constants of the human condition. And some sociologists and political scientists engage in a search for universals when they analyze the functional prerequisites of all social and political structures.

Such a search for structural forces can yield insights into motivation, ideological assumptions, and hidden interrelations. I am indebted to this intellectual tendency, even though I criticize its neglect of what is more apparent and accessible. With so many scholars engaged in searching for underlying structures, there is room for an inquiry which focuses attention on structures that can be derived from conventional data. Every new generation is heir to a legacy of institutions and traditions, whatever it may do to modify that legacy or add to it. The roots of these historically developed structures, of the culture and political institutions of any present-day society, reach far back into the past. In studying these roots I strive to free our understanding of the stereotyped contrast between tradition and modernity.

There are other reasons for my choice of data as well. Pedagogically, modern university teachers and students face a dilemma. In any scholarly discipline, the advance of knowledge depends on specialization. Hence, over the years, there has been a drift towards confining overall presentations to introductory courses, and towards putting increasing emphasis on teaching and research in specialized topics. The burden of relating the different specialties often devolves on the student and the popularizer. They have few models to follow, and face the risks of skimming over many areas without assistance. I think scholars must face those risks as well, for otherwise they ask their students to undertake syntheses they are unwilling to

attempt themselves. Yet the aim of scholarship should also be to improve our understanding of the social world in which we live. And that cannot be done without comprehensive and comparative appraisals.

In the present case it may be asked: Why go back so far? Will this help students to a better understanding of their world? Historical awareness in American culture seems curiously suspended between the two beliefs that "history is bunk" and that "he who ignores the past is bound to repeat it." Pragmatists and many social scientists among them, incline towards the first. The many cultivators of America's past and most historians incline towards the second. Even before World War II all of us have lived in a world greatly affected by the United States as an international power. Time and again we have experienced the encounter between our country and societies marked by older civilizations. In such encounters we may gradually be better able to cope psychologically, and possibly even politically, if our education prepared us to consider other countries and cultures from a more comprehensive standpoint than the knife-edge of the present.

Such an understanding is not facilitated by the rather lopsided view of the evidence which the social sciences have tended to encourage. Quite rightly, they have insisted on reliability of observation and on improving methods of verification. But achievements in these respects have been obtained at the price of restricting the time-horizon that can be considered. It is common knowledge that statistical records are most abundant in the industrialized countries of the world and even there only for the last century, roughly speaking. To be sure, efforts are under way to extend the aggregation of statistical data into the past where this seems possible and rewarding. But even if such efforts are successful, they would encompass only a small fraction of the historical record. The task would still remain to apply the insights developed in contemporary social science to the vast body of evidence which eludes rigorous analysis for want of quantifiable data. By extending our time-horizon, we should be able to learn more about authority and modernization than would be possible if our inquiry remained confined to data of our time or of the recent past.

LIMITATIONS

Today, England, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia are among the most industrialized countries of the world. But historically, these countries also represent successive turning-points from the medieval to the modern world. The revolutions of seventeenth-century England, the French Revolution, the English industrial revolution, the reform movements in Germany and Japan during the nineteenth century, and the Bolshevik Revolution of the twentieth century provide a scenario of the "modern revolution," having a cumulative effect on each other and on the rest of the world.

But several omissions deserve comment. Small countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands have achieved stable authority structures through federation

and the delegation of authority rather than through royalty and conquest. Where state-building by conquest is not a realistic possibility, small countries depend for their autonomy on a continuing balance of forces among the great powers. That situation poses separate analytic problems with which I do not deal. Also, modern nation-states (like the Americas, Australia, or New Zealand) which have emerged more recently from European settlements overseas present problems of their own. Because the institutions of the state were available at the time of settlement, fragments of established institutions could be taken over from their land of origin and adapted at will. The migrant settlers also vastly outnumbered the native population.

Perhaps the most serious limitation of my study is that it excludes societies in which state-building must occur under conditions of the twentieth century. These "new states" pose completely different analytic problems. Some countries of Asia and Africa have had state institutions in the past, but today must rebuild them on new foundations. Other countries have emerged from centuries of cultural cross-currents and a recent period of colonial subjection: they are now trying to build a state in the twentieth century, after all the major powers of the world have established their polities. What does it mean to be a Turkish citizen in a country which has taken its language from Central Asia, its religion from the Arabs, its educational system from France, its taste of clothing from Italy, and its government from a variety of European and American sources? Or what does it mean to be a Nigerian citizen in a country of many tribal languages, in which indigenous religion has been combined with Christianity and Islam, where the judicial and governmental system derives from indigenous sources, from Koranic law and much later from the British colonial rulers, which has experienced Portuguese and British explorers and slave traders, and which has won independence after World War II? In these "new states," the divisions based on primordial allegiances are accentuated by the extension of the franchise, and just at a time when unity is needed to achieve political stability (Fallers; Geertz; Goody). In this respect, the new states differ from the old ones. For in the latter, centuries of effort at political integration under monarchical authority had passed before rule in the name of the people brought out the divisive tendencies which remained.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

My approach to social history differs from mere reportage and from the more theoretical approaches to comparative studies. To compare, for example, kingship in Western and Chinese civilization, or intellectual mobilization in sixteenth-century England and eighteenth-century Germany, one must ask questions of the material. These questions must be broad enough for comparison to be possible, and such questions rest on concepts absent from mere reportage. But the concepts suitable for comparisons which preserve a sense of historical particularity are also less comprehensive than the more abstract and systematic concepts of social theory. For

purposes of the comparisons here envisaged, it is no solution to make the concepts either more precise or more comprehensive. In the one case, concepts become inapplicable to a number of diverse cases in proportion as they become more strictly applicable to any one of them. In the other, concepts become inapplicable to any specific case, as they become applicable to all cases. This is the case for ideal types. Logically, all concepts begin with universals. But once these are stated, it becomes necessary to provide links between such universals and the case materials to be studied. Here are some relevant applications of the precepts germane to my study.

Authority and inequality are basic dimensions of all social structures. If governed at all, societies are governed by the few. Where authority is present, inequality will occur as well.

The few can reach an understanding among themselves more quickly than the many: the presence of authority thus eases the cooperative achievement of tasks, especially where many people are involved and the situation is complex. Moreover, the few can exploit the understandings they reach among themselves in the interest of decision-making and the protection of their own advantages.

Authority differs from power by its dependence on the belief that it is legitimate. For authority to be effective for any length of time, beliefs in its legitimacy must be shared by the few and the many. The desire of those in authority to be considered legitimate is nearly universal. As Max Weber pointed out, the few want to know that they have a *right* to their good fortune and that they deserve it in comparison with others (271). I would add that their position will be the more secure, the more strongly the many are swayed by awe and the conviction that subordination will yield them a return in protection and prosperity.

It may be objected that power alone matters, that concern with legitimation and the mandate to rule merely assuage the conscience of the powerful. I think this view mistaken. Power needs legitimation the way a modern bank needs the confidence of its depositors. Rulers are always few in number and could never obtain compliance if each command had to be backed up by a force sufficient to compel compliance. Likewise, banks rely on the confidence of their depositors which allows them to retain only a small fraction of total deposits as liquid assets while investing the rest. All is well as long as depositors believe that the bank will cash their checks on demand, and as long as citizens believe that the government has the ability to deliver on its promises and sufficient force to back up its commands. A run on the bank is like a massive challenge of state-authority, for both may demonstrate that the bank's and the state's resources are not sufficient to withstand such a loss of confidence. Legitimation achieves what power alone cannot, for it establishes that belief in the rightness of rule which precludes massive challenges as long as it endures.

Thus, the emphasis is on legitimate rule or authority, not on power. Yet, power or the actual domination over a subject population is not confined to legitimate rule. In practice, authority and power converge or diverge in rather intricate ways. One can distinguish broadly between societies under consecrated

rule, in which authority and power tend to converge, and those under popular rule in which they tend to diverge.

In traditional societies rule was consecrated and was therefore legitimate. In an important sense the institution of monarchy survived for as long as it did despite succession struggles and the many other vicissitudes of royal fortunes because claimants and counterclaimants to the throne, each with his entourage of powerful magnates, all accepted the sanctity of kingship. This mutual acceptance of kingship was quite compatible with power struggles among the few, both for central power and over its decentralization. The foremost reason for this compatibility was probably that the political arena was confined to the few and that the mass of the population tended to acquiesce.

Prior to the modern era, the major societies of Europe and Asia had some features in common. More than eighty percent of the people lived on the land.[2] Population growth was slow, frequently checked by wars and epidemics. The bulk of the population lived close to the subsistence level. Nevertheless, the slow growth of numbers, some advances in technology, and massive exploitation of the people produced a surplus sufficient to sustain large political units, the development of some urban centers with specialized crafts, and a considerable military establishment (Lenski, 194–210). More important for our purposes, these societies were marked by a concentration of wealth, status, and authority in the hands of the governing class, which made up between one and two percent of the population, but appropriated not less than one-half of the society's total income.[3] Under these conditions, kingship represented the summit of the social and political hierarchy, symbolically if not also actually. And the ruling few were held together by their acceptance of that hierarchy under the king, even as they fought one another for a greater share of wealth, or of the less tangible satisfactions of status and precedence.

This structure of authority was reenforced by religious consecration and a world view which made inequality appear a part of the eternal order of things. To us, widespread inequality may suggest unremitting coercion and continuous, latent rebellion. But in many societies and for many centuries, the vast mass of people acquiesced in the established order as part of their inevitable fate. They acquiesced out of religious awe and a desire for peace and security. And security, however oppressive, was to be found in the status to which each individual was firmly bound by his patriarchically governed household and community.[4]

These are some of the reasons why traditional societies seemed rather similar to men who looked at them from the vantage point of Europe since the latter part of the eighteenth century. A certain stereotype of the "traditional society" has dominated social thought to this day. But the fact is that premodern societies were differentiated from one another at an early time and that one cannot explain the persisting differences among them unless one understands their traditions which arose from that early differentiation.

In societies under popular rule, authority and power tend to diverge. Something must be said concerning this condition, although my principal concern is with the emergence rather than the functioning of modern societies. When the people are

sovereign and representatives rule in their name, all adults ("the many") are engaged in principle in defining the political will, though the few still have easy access to the decision-making process. But the political arena is not confined to the few; political debate is public, and political disagreements proliferate in rough proportion to the number and diversity of the participants.

Under these conditions, far more people have power than have authority. Where popular sovereignty prevails, every adult is entitled to participate in the political process; everyone has power in that sense, even though authority is exercised only by elected or appointed officials. For that reason officials are only at a small remove from ordinary citizens at the symbolic level, even if the authority of their office is very great and generally acknowledged. Moreover, authority itself is limited, because under democratic constitutions the highest elected officials derive their right to rule from the people and for a stated period.

Accordingly, authority and power diverge actually and symbolically. In practice, those in authority and the few who have easy access to them exercise enormous power in a modern state, certainly in excess of their formal entitlement which remains vague and perhaps must remain so. But in theory, their authority is limited and temporary, while the people alone possess a plenitude of both authority and power.

CONCEPTS OF MODERNIZATION

How, then, do these general considerations apply to the process of modernization? It is easiest to define modernization in terms of the breakdown of the ideal-typical traditional order. Authority loses its earlier sanctity, monarchy declines, and the hierarchic social order is disrupted in theory and practice. Secular authority, rule in the name of the people, and an equalitarian social order are typical attributes of a modern society. There have been a number of efforts to interpret modernization in its several aspects.

The changes which came to a head during the eighteenth century were a transformation of human society perhaps comparable in magnitude to the change from nomadic to agricultural life some ten thousand years earlier. The contemporaries who reflected on this change were among the first to articulate the contrast between tradition and modernity. To the theorists of the day, the division of labor appeared as a key factor in this modern transformation. In his *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, Adam Ferguson attributed the progress of a people to the subdivision of tasks; his discussion formulates a way of looking at modern society which has become commonplace. The division of labor increases the productivity of those who specialize, and so the wealth of their country. Hence, private ends, lack of conscious concern for public welfare and public benefits all go together. Ferguson adhered to the older conventional wisdom when he portrayed society as divided into a leisured, ruling minority and the bulk of the working population. Members of the higher class are bound to no task and are free to follow their mental and emotional

disposition. On the other hand, those who eke out a mere subsistence are degraded by the "objects they pursue, and by the means they employ to attain" those objects. But production is also increased as a result of such degradation. In Ferguson's view, the economic ends of society are best promoted by mechanical arts requiring little capacity and thriving best "under a total suppression of sentiment and reason" (208–9, 305, and passim). In this, Ferguson pointed to the problems of an emerging industrial society, but complacently enough in view of his conventional acceptance of social inequality.

Karl Marx used the insights of Ferguson's work, but wanted analysis to be a guide for action. He believed he had discovered the "laws of capitalist development" and that knowledge of these laws would help reorganize society to better meet human needs. Marx also believed that the time was ripe for such a radical reorganization. Capitalism would spread everywhere and create the preconditions of its own overthrow.

Max Weber wanted to help preserve what men valued in the Western cultural tradition. This was one reason why he looked to the religious and ethical beliefs bound up with the early capitalist mode of production. His discovery that purely materialistic striving also had spiritual roots made him skeptical of interpretations which emphasized the division of labor alone. But he was also convinced that the imperatives of capitalist production and bureaucratic organization would suppress the individual and obliterate much cultural diversity. He thought the prospect of the future bleak.

The whole development of popular rule and of capitalist production has been accompanied by theories of modernization like those of Ferguson, Marx, and Weber, if only because these developments have created ever new confrontations between monarchic and democratic authority and between non-industrial and industrial ways of life. In fact, modernization is only the latest term for the contrast with tradition which other writers have put in terms of status and contract, aristocratic and commercial nations, or community and society. Such earlier formulations (including those of Ferguson, Marx, and Weber) were prompted by moral and political concerns. More recently, however, theories of modernization have been advanced in another spirit. They have focused on the necessary and sufficient conditions of modernization. Once these prerequisites of modernization are given, the change toward a modern society appears inevitable. This rather categorizing and ahistorical approach has tended to replace both Marx's concern with historical actors and Weber's emphasis on historical configurations as mixed types, and on the importance of meaning. One can speculate that these latter-day theories of modernization have been formulated in the hope that a causal analysis based on the isolation of dependent and independent variables would facilitate the management of social change.[5]

In my view, Marx was right to anticipate worldwide repercussions of capitalism and to see a revolutionary potential in its spread. But he was wrong in confining this potential to the economic sphere and the mounting class struggle in capitalist societies. I believe that the chances of revolution increase wherever the

industrial way of life and ideas of popular sovereignty disrupt a preexisting social order, that is in the *early* phases of industrialization and democratization, however protracted these may be. Also, the term modernization is applied best where non-industrial ways of life and hierarchic social orders are threatened by industrial ways and egalitarian social norms.[6]

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

There are other sources of change and differentiation than those rooted in the division of labor. After all, agricultural societies have comparatively little division of labor and would, therefore, have little change and little internal differentiation. This is factually wrong. We should not presuppose that the division of labor which is *a* key to change in economically developing societies, is *the* key to change in all societies.

Naturally, observers were impressed—and rightly so—by the part the division of labor played in the economic development of all Western European societies, especially England. Since the modern industrial revolution had *begun* in England, other countries followed the English model when they began to develop their own industry. But they wanted to follow the *latest* English development to which they could gain access, not the English practices of the 1760s with which English industrialization began. Countries were, therefore, less and less able (or willing) to repeat each other's development. And where later efforts at industrialization were successful, the result was continued political and cultural differentiation.

In his study of *Medieval Cities*, Henri Pirenne showed how this "demonstration effect" had worked in the past. The merchant and craft guilds of a few cities had used force to gain recognition for their independent jurisdiction from their feudal overlords. Consequently, a good many other rulers took the hint and negotiated a settlement with their own cities before they came to an armed conflict. But these events occurred prior to the modern revolution of communications. With the invention of printing in the fifteenth century, ideas were more quickly communicated. The growth of an educated public provided a gradually increasing audience for writers and artists. This development coincided in turn with the growth of modern science. We may call this simultaneous development of writers, artists, scientists, and an educated public "intellectual mobilization" on an international scale. It encouraged in each country the development of an elite, sensitive to the development of ideas and ready to apply in their own country ideas developed elsewhere. Increasingly, countries became examples to each other, to be followed or resisted as the case might be.

The period since 1500 is also the period of rising nationalism, another byproduct of intellectual mobilization and another reason for the likelihood of continued cultural differentiation. Nationalism increased as changes occurring in pioneering countries became objects of emulation or resistance in others. There is a deep ambivalence in this process. What appears highly desirable from the point of

view of progress will often appear as a danger to national independence or self-respect. Every idea taken over from elsewhere can be both an asset to the development of the country and a reminder of its comparative backwardness, both a challenge to be emulated, and, whatever its utility, a threat to national identity.

The modern world has made us familiar with this problem. Each country must cope socially and politically with the disruptive impact of ideas and industrial practices taken over from abroad. Its ability or inability to do so is conditioned to a considerable extent by the social and political structure it has inherited from the past. The uniqueness of a civilization can tell us something about that country's response to ideas and institutions that have developed in other economically and politically influential countries. For the old societies that try to become "new states" look back on centuries of history, and this is the base from which they must cope with the impact of the "advanced world." Today, even economically developed countries struggle with the unresolved legacies of that process although they have achieved a functioning political structure, i.e., the state. Accordingly, the achievement of "the state" is always provisional, and especially so in countries which perhaps have been called "the new states" prematurely. For that designation presupposes what is still at issue. Today, the former colonies that have become independent since World War II must try to reconcile political unity with diverse group allegiances, as other countries have attempted to do since they achieved independence early in the nineteenth century. The "new states" of yesterday and of today are weak because they are poor and institutionally fragile. And they are especially weak because they must face at the same time a proliferation of demands arising from the claims of existing groups, based on religious, ethnic, and many other affinities. My comparative study deals only with the "developed" countries, but it is arresting to reflect that their seemingly enduring institutions are yet a precarious achievement.

NOTES

1. The terms tradition and modernity are troublesome, but difficult to avoid. As suggested in this paragraph, there are important distinctions between medieval and modern history, and the terms tradition and modernity evoke these distinctions. There are also many unwarranted extrapolations of these terms, which this study is designed to put into proper perspective. I have dispensed with the use of quotation marks to suggest my reservations. For a critique of this terminology cf. Reinhard Bendix (250–314).
2. On the basis of technological criteria Gerhard Lenski calls societies agrarian as distinguished from horticultural and hunting and gathering societies. He notes, but does not treat, the distinctive aspects of maritime societies (e.g., Venice, Carthage, Holland, etc.), perhaps because the latter depended in good part on the surplus products of agrarian societies. Agrarian (and maritime) societies are also distinguished from the other types by possessing written histories, and this is the restricted sense in which the term "traditional" is used here.
3. This estimate of Lenski's is based on two studies, England in the seventeenth century and China in the nineteenth century (228). For eighteenth-century England, David Hume estimated that the crown alone controlled more than 30 percent of the national income (III, 124).
4. Marx's statement concerning peasants in nineteenth-century France applies here: "The small peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another, instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. . . . Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union, and no political organization, they do not form a class" (109). For a good statement of the Western interpretation of the social rank-hierarchy as part of a consecrated, cosmic order see Theodore Spencer.

5. This is only one tendency among many. For a review of the entire literature and a special emphasis on its self-critical features see Hans-Ulrich Wehler.
6. For an analysis of modernization that does not result in modernity see my essay "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered." See also Wehler's essay for an analysis of the ideological assumptions underlying the idea of a "completed modernity," for example in American society.

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